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Abstract 
We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of 
derivate shareholder suits. In the vast majority of European jurisdictions, 
shareholders can bring a derivative action (for damages) against the management 
for breach of fiduciary duty. In all of these countries, a derivative lawsuit is the 
only remedy against managerial misconduct. In spite of corporate fraud by 
managers there are no such lawsuits. We explain this apparent paradox on the 
basis of percentage limits. The laws of percentage limits require shareholders to 
hold a minimum amount of typically 5% to 10% in order to bring an action 
against the management and they are extremely wide-spread in Europe. Since 
small shareholders are not entitled to sue, there is an incentive for managers to 
collude with large shareholders. In a four-stage-model, we show that, given the 
current percentage limits, managers will misappropriate corporate assets and split 
the proceeds with large shareholders. Contrary to current and past approaches to 
agency theory, we find that, in this equilibrium, (1) large shareholders do not 
monitor the management, (2) small shareholders do not free ride and (3) the 
residual ownership is not held by the shareholders on the whole but by the 
managers and the large shareholders. This interpretation of the current situation 
is consistent with empirical studies that find a more concentrated shareholder 
structure in Europe than in the United States. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
In the vast majority of European jurisdictions minority shareholders can bring a derivative action 
against the management for breach of fiduciary duty.
1 Surprisingly in spite of corporate fraud, 
there are practically no such lawsuits in continental Europe. Both the European Jurists Forum as 
well as the German Jurists Forum have issued experts opinions that include various proposals for 
a better regulation of management liability.
2 The German law of 2005 (UMAG) has recently 
amended the corporation act in this regard.
3 The answer to the main puzzle, i.e. the absence of 
derivative lawsuits in Europe, is crucial to any regulation that seeks to incentivize shareholder 
suits as a deterrence for managerial misconduct. This will also give us a better understanding of 
the residual ownership of the corporation. 
So  far  no  theoretic  models  have  been  developed  to  explain  the  absence  of  derivative  suits; 
however,  intuitive  reasons  have  been  offered  in  the  legal  literature.  It  was  argued  that  the 
shareholders are subject to a free rider problem.
4 Derivative suits are brought on behalf of the 
corporation,  so  that  the  damage  payments  go  to  the  corporation  as  a  whole;  however,  the 
litigation costs have to be borne by the plaintiff, in case he loses. These asymmetric payoffs 
would cause every single shareholder to wait for other shareholders to bring an action and in the 
end no one would sue the managers.
5 The problem with this argument is if misappropriation of 
corporate funds is not sanctioned at all, the manager would simply misappropriate as much 
corporate assets as possible. Then, of course, every single shareholder would be better off by 
bringing an action which results in an equilibrium where there are some suits and where there is 
some misappropriation. Even though there may be fewer lawsuits than socially optimal there will 
always be some suits, which is supported by the fact that are plenty of lawsuits in the United 
States.
6 
We will offer an alternative explanation for why there are no lawsuits based on percentage limits 
and  explain  what  happens  if  we  lowered  the  thresholds.  Reform  proposals  that  suggest  to 
decrease the percentage limits
7 argue that a mere decrease will have little or no effect. The 
argument is, whatever the reason for the lack of suit may be, small shareholders have fewer 
incentives to bring an action than large shareholders; thus adding small shareholders to the pool 
of potential plaintiffs would not change the current situation.
8 Consequently, authors propose to 
provide for plaintiff’s reward or contingency fee for the plaintiff shareholder, respectively.
9 We 
will show that decreasing the percentage limits beyond a certain threshold will itself change the 
current situation. That is not to argue against plaintiff’s rewards; however, plaintiff’s rewards 
may be problematic with respect to national legal capital regimes. Our analysis will also allow 
                                                 
1 In greater detail see Kalss (ed., 2005). 
2 Kalss (2005a); Baums (2000). The scholarly discussion includes e.g. Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005). 
3 German Law of September 22, 2005, BGBl. I 2005, No. 60., p. 2802 (Sept. 27, 2005), Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG). 
4 Adams (1997). 
5 This is known as the Volunteers Dilemma, Poundstone (1992) pp. 201 203 
6 Romano (1991). 
7 Apparently, a 1% limit seems to be a popular compromise (see Ulmer (1999) and the Jurists Forum experts opinions cited under 
FN 2). Accordingly, for the United States Thompson & Thomas (2004) argue that the demand requirement in order to bring a 
derivate suit shall not apply to 1% shareholders. See also the Amended Proposal of 20 November 1991 for a Fifth Directive, 
COM (91) 372 final, which provides for a 5 % threshold and an ECU (Euro) face value threshold. 
8 Kalss (2005). The argument that small shareholder have fewer incentives than large shareholders was made ceteris paribus (and 
not generally) by Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005) who also explain that decreasing the limits may have an effect.  
9 E.g. Adams (1997); compare also Wenger (1997). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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for some implications to show that the current percentage limits allocate the residual ownership 
of the corporation to the managers and the large shareholders, not to small shareholders. 
In  a  large  number  of  European  countries  not  all  minority  shareholders  can  bring  an  action 
against the management for breach of fiduciary duties. Instead, the right to sue the management 
is allocated to shareholders with a stake of at least either 5% (Czech Republic, Spain, Slovakia) 
or 10% (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden).
10 Germany has recently lowered the 
10% threshold to 1%, Italy from 5% to 2.5%. Small shareholders could form a group in order to 
reach  the  percentage  limit  which  typically  is  allowed  by  European  national  jurisdictions. 
However, there are no procedural provisions for class actions; consequently, a large number of 
shareholders  would  have  to  incur  prohibitively  high  costs  in  order  to  act  collectively. 
Commonly, commentators justify the minimum stock requirement and other limitations on the 
basis of frivolous suits.
11 They argue that small shareholders would sue more frequently than 
socially optimal or sue even though they know that the managers have not violated the law. 
However, under the current regulation, the management can misappropriate corporate assets and 
split the proceeds with the shareholders that are entitled to bring an action. 
Our  paper  ties  in  with  the  scarce  game  theoretical  literature  on  derivative  shareholder  suits 
(Stepanov, 2006) as well as with agency models (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Private benefits 
are a well known phenomenon absent percentage limits and have been described as an agency 
problem between the management and the shareholders. It is conventionally believed that large 
shareholders mitigate the agency problem between the management and the shareholders but 
they create a new agency problem, namely between large and small shareholders (Black, 1992; 
Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, 1994; Gilson & Gordon, 2003). Empirical evidence, which shows 
that large blocks trade at a higher price than single shares, supports this theory (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989 and 1992; Zingales, 1995). Of course, collusion between large shareholders 
and  managers  cannot  explain,  absent  percentage  limits,  why  there  are  no  suits.  Small 
shareholders  would  monitor  and  sanction  misappropriation  by  large  shareholders;  we  would 
expect  some  misappropriation  and  some  lawsuits.  With  percentage  limits  the  picture  looks 
different  because  the  manager  can  bribe  the  plaintiff shareholders.  Other  than  most  agency 
models (e.g. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Grossmann & Hart, 1983; 
Demsetz, 1986), we find an equilibrium with zero monitoring, where managers, together with 
large shareholders are the residual owners of the firm.
 In this equilibrium there are also no 
lawsuits.  Only  if  percentage  limits  are  decreased  beyond  a  certain  threshold  the  results  are 
consistent with conventional models. The managers will sometimes misappropriate corporate 
assets and shareholders will sometimes sanction this behavior. Managers will not be the residual 
owners of the firms anymore. 
                                                 
10 Rada & Hanslik (2005); Oelkers (2005); Grechenig (2005); Mašurová (2005); Daskalov (2005); Gálffy (2005); Prelič & 
Babuder (2005); Zechner (2005) and the whole collected edition. There are other countries with percentage limits and no 
derivative suits, like China; see Zhang (2007). It is worthwhile noting that Switzerland, France and England do not provide for 
percentage limits; hence, our analysis does not apply to these countries. We acknowledge that there may be countries without 
percentage and lawsuits which suggests that there may be other mechanisms (like prohibitively high non refundable litigation 
costs) which prevent lawsuits. 
11 E.g. Ulmer (1999) at 327 329; Baums (2000) at F 249 251. With respect to the United States see Loewenstein (1999) arguing 
that awarding attorneys’ fees often results in an over incentivation of shareholder suits; see also Romano (1991); for Japan: 
West (2001). A number of studies have analyzed in a general context how plaintiffs can credibly threat to bring a negative 
NPV suit; e.g. Bebchuk (1988).  No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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A model of shareholder suits 
At t=0, in a given firm, there is a manager M and a plaintiff shareholder P entitled to bring an 
action with a stake of  ∈(0;1) which both can observe. The remaining shareholders that hold a 
stake 1–  are not entitled to bring an action and thus are not actors in our model. We abstract 
from collective action problems that may arise if there is more than one plaintiff shareholder. 
Under current law, only very few, well coordinated shareholders are allowed to bring an action, 
so that P could also be a coalition of potential plaintiffs.
12 This is not crucial to our main results 
as they hold true for n plaintiff shareholders whether or not they are coordinated. The lower the 
legal percentage threshold to bring an action is, the higher is  . Clearly, the total share that will 
be able to bring an action will be larger if the percentage limit is 1% than if it were 10%. Any 
shareholder that holds between 1% and 10% would only be allowed to bring an action under the 
first rule. 
At  t=1,  P  chooses  his  monitoring  costs  m∈[0;∞)  which  the  manager  M  can  observe.  The 
manager knows how frequently P asks for information and how detailed the information has to 
be. 
At t=2 the manager decides whether (Ψ=1) or not (Ψ=0) to misappropriate a given fraction 
α∈(0;1) of the corporate assets A∈(0;∞) to the detriment of all shareholders. αA could be an 
opportunity  of  private  rent  extraction  in  the  course  of  a  takeover  or  any  other  self dealing 
opportunity. This kind of misappropriation refers to all kinds of wealth transfers with a personal 
interest of the manager (often refered to as tunneling), including the misappropriation of an 
investment opportunity that belongs to the corporation, and the employment of an unqualified 
applicant who is a close friend of the manager. P does not know whether or not M has stolen 
(that is, Ψ∈{0,1} is hidden action). However, we assume that αA is common knowledge and 
thus also known by P. This reflects the fact that everybody has some minimum information 
about potential (not actual) misappropriation. Moreover, any investor with a share large enough 
to bring an action is likely to be respresented in the board and thus has direct access to such 
information. 
Because the manager has to camouflage his actions his gains are somewhat lower, discounted by 
β∈(0;1)  where  β  will  be  close  to  1  if  misappropriation  is  almost  costless  and  close  to  0 
otherwise. Those concealment costs are common knowledge and may involve the formation of a 
separate company, bribing the news media, potential criminal sanctions etc. At this point, M can 
also decide whether or not to offer P a bribe Φ∈[0;∞) in order to induce P not to bring a lawsuit 
(where  Φ=0  means  no  bribe).  The  payoff  of  the  manager  for  not  stealing  is  zero.  Any 
reputational gain he may receive for an honest behavior will be captured by β; that is, potential 
reputational gains increase the opportunity costs of stealing.
13  
At t=3, P receives a signal S∈{0,1} that indicates whether or not M has breached the law, where 
1 means that he has stolen αA and 0 that he has not stolen αA. We define s(m)∈[0.5;1) as the 
probability that the signal is correct [s(m) = prob (S = 0 | Ψ = 0) = prob (S = 1 | Ψ = 1)]. If P 
                                                 
12 This may also include two shareholders that reach the required percentage limit only if they act together. Due to their relatively 
small number, those large shareholders do not need a special procedure regulating collective actions, in order to bring a 
lawsuit. Note, however, that we have assumed (see above p. 4.) that small shareholders cannot act collectively in order to 
reach the legally required percentage limit due to the high costs associated with a collective action. 
13 Note that this model does not involve a repeated game; we refer to reputation arguments in order to suggest that a repeated 
game would not yield any different result.  No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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chooses zero monitoring costs [m=0], the signal is random [s(0)=0.5]. Shareholders that choose 
higher monitoring costs will receive a better signal at a marginally decreasing rate [s(m)’>0, 
s(m)’’<0]. We also assume that S is asymptotically correct [limm→∞ s(m)=1] and that the first 
marginal unit of monitoring is infinitely useful [limm→0 s’(m)=∞].
14 The signal function [s(m)] is 
common knowledge. 
At t=4, P decides whether (Θ=1) or not (Θ=0) to bring an action against the manager, depending 
on the chosen monitoring costs, the observed signal and the offer he may have received. P’s 
information is (m, S, Φ). Since the damage payments go to the corporation as such, P receives 
only  αA, if he wins. Instead of bringing a lawsuit, P can decide to accept the bribe or settlement 
offer, respectively, if M has made one. We assume that P accepts the offer made if he decides 
not to bring an action. The pre trial settlement payment would be made to P only and not to the 
remaining shareholders. Under most European jurisdictions such settlements would be illegal 
and thus not enforceable. In this case, settlement payments would be considered bribes. P could 
accept the settlement payment and then bring an action on behalf of the corporation or pass the 
information on to somebody else etc. However, payments can be made and potential plaintiffs 
that have received a bribe will not bring an action. If they brought an action subsequently to 
having received a bribe they will be held liable for their collusive conduct and have to return 
more than the bribe to the other shareholders. Since parties can credibly commit to abiding by 
the  settlement  agreement  (bribe),  we  treat  pre trial  settlements  as  enforceable.  If  a  suit  is 
successful the damages paid go to the corporation, i. e. each shareholder benefits from the action 
to the extent of his individual participation. Since there are no punitive damages the shareholders 
cannot end up with a payoff larger than zero. They can only retrieve what has been taken from 
them. The litigation costs c are borne by the loser (that is, by the plaintiff shareholder if he loses 
and not by all shareholders)
15 and include the costs of the winning party.
16 
 
Note that we could also assume the settlement offer Φ to be made at t=3, that is, after the 
stealing decision. This makes no difference, since M cannot observe the signal P has received 
and the offer Φ does not influence the signal. The fact that P could approach M with a settlement 
offer and that there may be additional time periods where the parties negotiate for a settlement 
payment is irrelevant because it is always P who has to make the last decision and M is always 
well off if negotiations are never ending. Moreover, suits are limited to a certain time period 
after  the  damage  occurs.  Consequently,  M  has  the  power  to  make  a  take it or leave it offer 
which makes all preceeding negotiations irrelevant. 
We  will  exclude  settlements  after  the  suit  was  brought  because  of  procedural  obstacles. 
Typically  the  majority  of  shareholders  has  to  approve  such  a  settlement,  a  certain  minority 
(equivalent to the minority entitled to bring an action) must not dissent and the payment would 
go to the corporation on the whole. This assumption is irrelevant for explaining the absence of 
lawsuits, since by definition a suit has been brought in this case; besides, it would simply lower 
the litigation costs without any substantial change in the results. 
                                                 
14 This assumption helps us to distinguish between two cases: one where M does not monitor because of prohibitively high 
monitoring costs and the case where M decides strategically not to monitor independent of the costs. 
15 This is the law in virtually all European countries; see Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005) and the whole collected edition. 
16 We could distinguish between the total costs of M (cM) and the total costs of P (cP), where cM could include costs that go 
beyond the costs captured by β (a reputational loss, crimimal sanctions etc for the case that M has lost the lawsuit). However, 
this does not affect the calculation of equilibria and thus yields the same main results. No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
 
  7 
In addition to derivative suits, national legislators allow shareholders to bring a direct lawsuit 
where damages are paid directly to the plaintiff shareholder. However, this remedy is restricted 
to extremely few cases and certainly does not apply to a misappropriation of corporate assets; 
thus, we will exclude this kind of lawsuit from our considerations.
17 
We will assume that M and P are risk neutral.
18 We will also assume that the courts decisions are 
correct which is not implausible in our setup. Many analyses have focused on business decisions 
that courts find hard to evaluate. Accordingly, those results are based on the assumption that the 
courts decisions are not correct but wrong in either a biased or an unbiased way. On this basis 
the  business  judgment  rule  or  some  European  equivalent  was  justified  for  cases  where  the 
managers were not subject to a conflict of interest. Since the managers are shielded from liability 
in  those  cases,  we  exclude  them  from  our  considerations.  In  recent  years,  the  attention  has 
shifted to transactions where the managers have a personal interest, like the various ways of 
misappropriating corporate assets. In these cases, it was hardly doubtful whether or not managers 
acted unlawfully. The fact that judges, other than the shareholders, can observe the manager’s 
decision in our model is due to comprehensive legal powers, including the possibility to request 
and obtain undisclosed documents. 
A strategy of M includes a combination of the stealing decision and the bribing decision for 
every possible monitoring choice of P: {{Ψ│Ψ∈{0,1}}×{Φ│Φ≥0}}
{m│m≥0} 
A strategy of P includes a monitoring choice, and the choice of suing M for every possible 





Settlement offers (bribes) 
We solve the game backwards. We treat m as exogenously given, since m can be observed by 
both players. Because the monitoring costs are sunk at this time we will not display them in P’s 
payoffs. Of course, this does not change the strategic behavior of the actors. After solving all 
subgames we add the monitoring costs to the outcomes and solve the problem of the optimal 
monitoring choice. We will start with the pre trial settlement negotiation problem. 
 
                                                 
17 The same is true for rights of creditors to bring an action which some European legislators provide for; compare Eckert, 
Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005) at 126 et seq with a short summary of the economics of these suits. 
18 Risk aversion of M could be modeled through higher opportunity and litigation costs. 







whether or not 







not to sue M 
P (Plaintiff 
shareholder) 
with a stake 
 ∈(0;1)      
M (Manager) 
Φ∈[0,∞) 
M can make a settlement offer No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
 
  8 
Proposition 1. If M decides to make an offer (depending on the parameters of the model), the 
offer will always be  αA and P will always accept it. M will only offer  αA if he has previously 
stolen αA. (All other strategies are not part of a sequential equilibrium).
19 
 
Proof. [see Appendix] 
 
The intuition behind the fact that the only possible offer is  αA is the following:  αA is the 
maximum amount P can obtain by bringing a lawsuit (that is the stolen amount αA times the 
stake of the shareholder  ). Any offer lower than  αA would inform P of an illegal conduct; P 
would reject the offer, bring a lawsuit and obtain full compensation for his loss ( αA). Any offer 
larger than that would be accepted by P. Of course, M will only offer the minimum amount that 
will be accepted by P (which is  αA).
20 
 
This will allow us to the define a reduced strategy set of M and P: 
 
Definintion 1. Define M’s reduced set of strategies as {Mh, Md, Mc}; where Mh means that the 
manager acts honestly (Ψ=0) and offers no bribe (Φ=0), Md that the manager acts dishonestly, 
that is M misappropriates αA (Ψ=1) without offering a bribe to P (Φ=0), and Mc means that M 
acts collusively, that is he misappropriates αA (Ψ=1) and offers P a bribe (Φ= αA).
21 
 
Definition 2. Define P’s reduced set of strategies as {Pa, Pv, Pc, Pb}; where, if no offer was made 
(Φ=0), Pa means that P does not bring an action (Θ=0), whether S=0 or S=1 (apathetic), Pv 
means  that  P  brings  an  action  (Θ=1)  if  S=1  and  does  not  bring  an  action  (Θ=0)  if  S=0 
(vigilant), Pc means that P brings an action (Θ=1) if S=0 and does not bring an action (Θ=0) if 
S=1 (confused), Pb means that he brings an action (Θ=1) whether S=0 or S=1 (belligerent). If 
an offer Φ= αA was made, P will accept it in all four strategies (Θ=0).
22 
 
This  will  leave  us  with  the  following  strategy  space:  {Pa,  Pv,  Pc,  Pb}×{Mh,  Md,  Mc}.  The 
remaining subgame game starting at t=2 can be displayed in a strategic form, with P’s payoffs on 
the left and M’s payoffs on the right. As noted, we abstract from the monitoring costs at this 
stage, thus m is not displayed in the table. 
 
  Mhonest  Mdishonest  Mcollusive 
Papathetic  0, 0    αA, βαA  0, (β– )αA 
Pvigilant  [1–s(m)]( c), 0 
[1–s(m)](  αA), 
[1–s(m)]βαA–s(m)[c+(1–β)αA] 
0, (β– )αA 
                                                 
19 For sequential equilibria see Kreps & Wilson (1982a). 
20 More precisely, P would be indifferent between accepting the offer and bringing a suit if M offered  αA, but M’s offer  αA is 
only the best response if P always accepts the offer. Otherwise, M would be better off by making an offer slightly above  αA. 
[see Appendix] 
21 Mh:=(0,Φ=0), Md:=(1, Φ=0), Mc:=(1,Φ= αA). 
22 All of P’s strategies in the reduced game are elements of the set (Pa, αA). Additionally Pa is element of (Pa,0), Pv is element of 
(Pv,0), Pc is element of (Pc,0), Pb is element of (Pb,0). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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Pconfused  s(m)( c), 0 
s(m)(  αA), 
s(m)βαA–[1–s(m)] [c+(1–β)αA] 
0, (β– )αA 
Pbelligerent   c, 0  0,  [c+(1–β)αA]  0, (β– )αA 
 
The current situation with high percentage limits:   < β 
No derivative lawsuits & zero monitoring 
Agency theory predicts that the shareholders will invest in monitoring until the marginal utility 
equals the marginal costs and that the managers will misappropriate corporate assets until his 
marginal utility equals his marginal costs. Consequently, there will be some monitoring and 
some  stealing.
23  The  same  should  be  true  for  shareholder  suits  as  a  form  of  monitoring. 
However, with percentage limits the case changes dramatically. 
To solve the remaining game we have to distinguish between two cases:  <β and  >β. The first 
case ( <β) stands for high percentage limits or low costs of stealing. With high percentage limits 
the coalition of potential plaintiff shareholders is small (low  ); low costs of stealing imply a 
high β. As outside observers we may not be able to exactly determine the costs of stealing in 
order to know which set of parameters represents our current situation. However, we will see 
that  <β is the only set of parameters that leads to an equilibrium where there are no lawsuits at 
all. From our empirical observation that there are no lawsuits we can conclude that this set of 
parameters best represents the current situation. Consequently, we will first solve  <β and then 
see what happens if the legislator decreased the percentage beyond a certain threshold so that 
 >β. 
 
Proposition 2.1. With high percentage limits,  <β, M will always steal [prob(Ψ=1)=1] and 
bribe P (dM
*=Mc). P will always accept the bribe (and play dP
*=Pb in a sequential equilibrium 
with justifiable beliefs.) There will be no lawsuits and no monitoring [l
*,m
*=0, where l
* is the 
probability of litigation (prob(Θ=1)) in equilibrium]. 
 
Proof. [see Appendix] 
 
Proposition 2.2. The results of proposition 2.1 hold true in a game of n uncoordinated plaintiff 
shareholders. 
 
Proof. [see Appendix] 
 
The intuition behind the fact that M will always steal and bribe P is the following: M will always 
extract private benefits because the value of the misappropriated assets to M exceeds the amount 
that is needed to bribe P [ αA<βαA], thus M’s strategy to be honest is strictly dominated by the 
strategy to act collusively. In anticipation of this fact, P would always bring an action if M made 
no offer; M will anticipate this and always make a settlement offer  αA; as noted above, the 
                                                 
23 E.g. Jensen & Meckling (1976). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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shareholder  will  always  accept  it.  Clearly,  if  P  knows  that  the  manager  will  misappropriate 
corporate assets he has no incentives to invest in obtaining this information. In other words, P 
does not rely on the signal because he knows the action of M.
24 The same argument applies to 
more than one plaintiff shareholder because M will always be better off bribing everyone as long 




 i<β). In both cases the 
shareholder(s)  will  choose  zero  monitoring.  Since  he  (they)  know(s)  the  manager  will 
misappropriate corporate assets it makes no sense for him (them) to invest in that knowledge. 
It  is  conventionally  believed  that  large  shareholders  monitor  the  managers  and  that  small 
shareholders are free riders.
25 Large shareholders have lower monitoring costs per single share; 
thus, they will have more incentives to monitor.
26 This disadvantage is argued to be offset by 
private benefits that large shareholders receive in compensation for their costs. In contrast to the 
dominant  view,  developed  against  the  background  of  American  law  where  every  single 
shareholder can bring an action, our model predicts that P (as our large shareholder) has no 
incentives  to  incur  those  monitoring  costs.  P  knows  that  the  manager  will  misappropriate 
corporate assets and thus will simply threaten to bring an action should he not be paid a bribe. In 
our model, the settlement payment is not a compensation for higher monitoring costs and small 
shareholders are not free riders because there is nothing to free ride. Moreover, these kinds of 
settlements have no deterrence effect on the manager’s decision to misappropriate different from 
regular settlements that are motivated by the saving of litigation costs. It should be noted that the 
fact that the manager takes every opportunity for misappropriation does not necessarily mean 
that there is actually a lot of misappropriation. The size of total misappropriation depends on the 
amount of the opportunities. 
 
Why small shareholders continue to invest 
Our model does not extend to the investors’ choice of a specific portfolio, i.e. most importantly 
the decision of a shareholder to hold more or less than the percentage limit required by law to 
bring an action. For the analysis of shareholder suits, it is sufficient to observe that there exists a 
certain distribution of shares. Still, one may argue that our analysis is inconsistent with the 
empirical observation that investors hold small stakes. We give an intuitive reason for why this is 
not true. 
One could ask why shareholders not entitled to bring an action continue to invest in the stock 
market. The manager cannot commit to repay the investment, hence, small shareholders would 
anticipate this commitment problem and refrain from entrusting the manager with their money. 
The fact that small shareholders continue to invest in countries with percentage limits may be 
due to the fact that there are simply no better alternative investments.
27 In order to attract outside 
capital, the manager builds up a reputation for future dividend payments by paying a sufficiently 
high return to outside investors. In order to be able to do that, he cannot misappropriate more 
than  a  certain  amount.  Because  of  this  reputational  effect,  small  outside  shareholders  will 
                                                 
24 It is worthwhile noting that {Mh, Pa} can never be played in equilibrium, not even in a repeated game. The reason is that M can 
diverge from Mh, and P cannot punish this behavior in the next period, since M has a payoff of zero when playing Mh 
independent of P’s strategy. 
25 Admati, Pfleider & Zechner (1994). 
26 The same argument was made with regard to shareholder suits; see van Aaken (2004), Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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continue to invest in the corporations.
28 Correspondingly, large investors will not try to buy out 
all small shareholders. Whoever buys the last remaining stock of diversified shares will not be 
able to extract private benefits because there is no one left to extract them from (that is the case 
for  =1).  
Our model is consistent with empirical data that suggests that there is a correlation between high 
ownership concentration and low investor protection
29 and countries, like the United States and 
England,  where  single  shareholders  can  bring  an  action  typically  have  a  more  dispersed 
ownership structure. It is also consistent with the fact that we observe lawsuits in the United 
States as well as in England. 
Moreover, the managers and the shareholders entitled to sue cannot misappropriate the whole 
corporate value because of potential liability under insolvency law. In most countries, there is a 
concentrated  procedure  under  which  many  managers  are  in  fact  held  liable  in  the  case  of 
bankruptcy.
30 For these reasons, it may make sense for small shareholders to continue to invest.
31 
This argument puts into perspective the seemingly radical result of massive misappropriation of 
corporate  assets.  How  much  exactly  the  mangers  can  misappropriate  depends  on  product 
markets.  If  product  markets  are  highly  efficient,  there  will  be  little  left  to  misappropriate 
(without causing insolvency and trigger subsequent liability) and α must fall within an interval 
much smaller than [0;1].
32 
 
Implications for the residual ownership – Shareholders as residual owners? 
It is conventionally believed that shareholders are the residual owners of the corporation. They 
receive whatever is left after the creditors, including the employees, have been paid from the 
corporate funds and thus bear most of the business risk associated with every corporation.
33 With 
percentage limits, the case is different. 
In our model, the equilibrium payoffs are UM
*=(β– )αA for the manager, UP
*=0 for the plaintiff 
shareholder, and UnP
*= (1– )αA for the non plaintiff shareholders. That is P receives a share of 
the benefits according to his participation and M ends up with the remaining part. We assumed 
that αA is a random opportunity for misappropriating corporate assets. However, we could also 
think of αA as the corporate profits. The manager could misappropriate this amount without 
going bancrupt and having to face potential personal liability under insolvency law. In this case, 
M and P are the residual owners of the firm.  
The manager would have to pay both the creditors and the small shareholders a fixed “dividend” 
which will depend on the need to build up a reputation in order to take up new capital in the 
future. Of course, the claims of shareholders are legally subordinated to the claims of creditors; 
thus they have to be compensated for that through a larger “dividend”. Still for both creditors 
and small shareholders, their payoffs are independent of the corporate profits as long as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 Compare Shleifer & Vishny (1997) with a useful overview of the literature. 
28 Gomes (2000); compare also Diamond (1989) for the debt market. However, reputational effects dissolve through backward 
induction as soon as the last period is known; for further references see Shleifer & Vishny (1997). 
29 La Porta, Lopez de Salinas, Shleifer & Vishny (1998). La Porta, Lopez de Salinas, Shleifer & Vishny (1999). Of course, those 
studies have been attacked on various accounts; e.g. Spamann (2006). 
30 See supra note 10 for references. 
31 Of course, ongoing investments by small shareholders may also be explained on behavioral accounts. 
32 E.g. Shleifer & Vishny (1997). 
33 Hansmann (1996). Easterbrook & Fischel (1991). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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corporation does not go bankrupt. The greatest part of the risk is borne by the manager and the 
plaintiff shareholder  who  are  the  residual  owners  of  the  corporation.  Even  though  further 
analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper, it is worthwhile mentioning that the risk is 
borne by those that are the least diversified. 
One may argue that the benefits are divided between M and P other than in our model. For once, 
behavioral studies suggest that P will decline an offer close to  αA and that M will anticipate this 
and offer a larger share of the private benefits βαA to P than slightly above  αA
34. Secondly, P 
may have a special negotiation power due to the right to replace M by another manager. Whether 
or not P has a right to remove M depends on his share and on the respective legal regulations 
which are quite heterogeneous in Europe.
35 In this case, P could be the main residual owner. 
However, by no means, the small shareholders will hold the residual ownership. Note that the 
division of benefits does not influence the pure strategy equilibrium (dM*=Mc and dP*=Pb) under 
which M will always steal αA and bribe P (with Φ∈[ αA;βαA] ) and under which P chooses 
zero monitoring costs, which holds true for n uncoordinated plaintiff shareholders. 
Lower percentage limits:   > β 
Suits & monitoring 
If the percentage limits are decreased beyond a certain threshold, the manager will not be able to 
bribe  the  plaintiff shareholder.  The  lower  percentage  limits  are,  the  higher  is     because  the 
coalition of potential plaintiff shareholders has a larger total share; thus, the larger the bribe has 
to be. At a certain point ( >β) the manager’s private benefits βαA are simply not large enough to 
bribe all potential plaintiff shareholders, so that M’s strategy to steal and bribe the plaintiff 
shareholder is strictly dominated by M’s strategy to act honestly. Clearly, this result cannot only 
be reached by lowering the percentage limits but also by increasing the costs of stealing (i. e. 
decreasing β), e. g. through more severe criminal sanctions. For clarification, legislator cannot 
exactly determine the limiting value  =β because the legislator does not know the exact costs of 
stealing (and because   and β vary across corporations). How far the percentage limits need to be 
decreased (or the costs of stealing be increased) is an empirical question. Only if percentage 
limits are abandoned altogether we can be sure that  >β in all firms (because  =1 and β<1). 
 
Proposition 3.1. With low percentage limits,  >β, M sometimes steals (0<prob(Ψ=1)<1) but 
never bribes P (dM





Proof. [see Appendix] 
 
Proposition 3.2. The fact that there is some stealing by M, the fact that there is no equilibrium 
without  litigation  and  no  equilibrium  without  monitoring  holds  true  for  n  uncoordinated 
plaintiff shareholders. 
 
                                                 
34 See e.g. Güth, Schmittberger & Schwarze (1982). 
35 For an overview see Arlt, Bervoets, Grechenig & Kalss (2002) and Arlt, Bervoets, Grechenig & Kalss (2003). For Spain see 
Grechenig (2005a). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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Proof. [see Appendix] 
 
The intuition behind the fact that there is no equilibrium without lawsuits is that the manager’s 
strategy to steal and bribe the shareholder(s) yields no positive payoff. In other words, the total 
costs of stealing and bribing are higher than the benefits. This is due to the fact that with low 
percentage limits the total stake of shareholders that can bring an action increases above the limit 
where too many shareholders have to be bribed. Since the manager cannot bribe all he will rather 
not  offer  bribes  anymore.  Since  M  does  not  offer  a  bribe  there  is  an  equilibrium  in  mixed 
strategies. 
Implications for the residual ownership 
If percentage limits are decreased beyond a certain threshold (so that  >β) the picture changes 
radically. Independent of the remaining parameters, there are some lawsuits by P and there is 
clearly less misappropriation by M. The fact that there is some misappropriation by M is what 


















































































) (      if                
) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 (  
   
0  
) (      if                                         
) 1 (
) 1 (














[See Appendix Proof of Proposition 3.1] 
 
M and P are not the joint residual owners of the corporation anymore as M looses his residual 
ownership and ends up with a payoff of zero. The residual owners are now the shareholders in 
general. Shareholders that are not entitled to bring an action are now able to free ride on the 
monitoring of P as they bear neither the monitoring costs nor the litigation costs. 
 
Discussion 
We have argued that the lack of derivative lawsuits in continental Europe is due to percentage 
limits as provided for in the various jurisdictions. Percentage limits establish that shareholders 
have to hold a minimum share of typically 5 or 10 % in order to bring an action against the 
management  for  breach  of  fiduciary  duty.  These  widespread  legal  provisions  allows  the 
managers to misappropriate corporate assets and bribe the potential plaintiff shareholders. In this 
case, all shareholders choose zero monitoring, the managers choose to misappropriate corporate 
assets and to offer the potential plaintiff shareholders a bribe which they accept. This could be No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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interpreted as an allocation of the residual ownership to the management and large shareholders, 
where small shareholders receive only a fixed “dividend”. If percentage limits are decreased 
beyond a certain threshold, potential plaintiff shareholders will monitor the managers and the 
managers will misappropriate corporate assets less often than before. In this case, there will be 
lawsuits detering the managers from their illegal conduct. The same result will be reached if the 
costs of stealing are increased beyond a certain threshold (lower β, so that  >β). To increase the 
costs fo stealing, e.g. by reforming criminal law etc, however, will be much more costly than 
simply reducing the percentage limits. Yet another possibility for the legislator to switch to the 
second  equilibrium,  where  there  is  less  stealing  ( >β),  is  to  facilitate  collective  lawsuits.  If 
getting together is less costly for shareholders, the total share of shareholders able to bring an 
action will be larger (higher  ). 
This  analysis  suggests  that  percentage  limits  increase  the  problem  of  bribery  and 
misappropriation.  However,  one  cannot  conclude  without  empirical  evidence  that  lower 
percentage limits would lead to higher social welfare. That is so because with high percentage 
limits there is more misappropriation and thus higher costs of stealing but no monitoring costs 
and no litigation costs. In turn, with low percentage limits, the total costs of stealing are clearly 
lower but costs associated with litigation and monitoring are higher. At this point, we can only 
say that an equilibrium where managers steal and bribe the large shareholders is unlikely to be 
socially optimal because it allocates the property right to corporate assets to those who value it 
the least. This is evident when we assume that the opportunity of misappropriation amounts to 
the profits a corporation has earned. Large shareholders and managers are likely to value the 
private benefits less than (small) shareholders because they are not diversified. Private benefits 
are just another volatile compensation that managers receive instead of regular salary (supposing 
that higher private benefits will be taken into account when negotiating for the total pay and thus 
lower the regular salary). However, private benefits are the worst kind of incentive contract 
because  other  than  stock  options  and  restricted  stock  (which  are  also  volatile),  there  is  no 
possibility for indexing, taking into account long term prospects etc. An incentive effect may be 
due to the fact that the ones that make the decisions (managers and large shareholders) are also 
the ones that profit if the decisions made are good and lose otherwise.  
In any case, by allocating the property right to the managers and large shareholders, capital 
markets  are  unlikely  to  optimally  develop  because  of  the  mentioned  commitment  problem. 
Shareholders will invest less than optimal if they cannot reap the full gains. Corporate charters 
that offer a contractual right to sue could undo this commitment problem and it is not clear why 
it is not offered by the large shareholders and the managers. One possible explanation could be 
that the reallocation of property rights would come at a loss of managers and large shareholders 
and  that  it  would  be  too  costly  for  small  shareholders  to  pay  managers  reallocation  due  to 
collective action problems. They would rather invest their money somewhere else. Still, open 
questions remain for further research. It is, for example, not clear why corporations that have just 
been established or have publicly offered the shares for the first time would not offer managerial 
liability. Moreover, it is not clear at what point percentage limits would be so low that potential 
plaintiff shareholders cannot be treated as one coalition of shareholders. Potential extensions of 
our model involve collective actions problems that arise once percentage limits are decreased 
beyond a certain threshold or abandoned altogether; biased courts; special rules of litigation etc. 
All in all, we have tried to spark a discussion on shareholder suits that goes both beyond the 
verbal arguments offered in the legal literature as well as beyond the empirical studies offered in No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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the economic literature. It emphasizes the importance of the laws on percentage limits that until 
now have been neglected. 
 No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof  of  Proposition  1.  M’s  full  set  of  strategies  (for  the  subgame  starting  at  t=2)  is 
DM={Ψ│Ψ∈{0,1}}×{Φ│ Φ∈[0; ∞)}, which includes the misapprobriation decision Ψ∈{0,1} 
and the bribing decision Φ∈[0; ∞). Note that M can also decide not to bribe P by choosing Φ=0. 
M’s decision of stealing is a hidden action and therefore cannot be observed by P. P has to 
decide whether or not to bring an action (Θ∈{0,1}), where no action means to accept the offer if 
M has made one.
36 Because P cannot directly observe whether the manager missapropriated αA, 
he can only form beliefs about the managers action. P’s information is Φ and S, and therefore 
(Φ,S) is an information set with two nodes (Ψ=0 and Ψ=1). A strategy of P (in the subgame 
starting at t=2) is a plan of suing or not for every possible information set (Φ,S). Thus the 
strategy set of P is: DP={Θ│Θ∈{0,1}}
{S│S∈{0,1}}×{Φ│Φ∈[0;∞)}
. 
For every given Φ there are two possible information sets, S=0 and S=1, both with two nodes 
(Ψ=0 and Ψ=1). In both information sets P has two possible actions, that is to bring an action or 
not to bring an action (Θ∈{0,1}). We now define plans for a given Φ: Pa means that P does not 
bring an action (Θ=0) independent of the signal (apathetic), Pv means that P brings an action 
(Θ=1) if S=1 and not (Θ=0) if S=0 (vigilant), Pc that P brings an action (Θ=1) if S=0 and not 
(Θ=0) if S=1 (confused), Pb that P always brings an action (Θ=1) (belligerent). We could now 
think  of  (Φ)  as  the  information  sets  with  two  nodes,  but  with  four  possible  actions  for  P, 





The following table shows the payoffs of the game for a given Φ. 
 
  Ψ=0  Ψ=1 
Papathetic  Φ,  Φ  Φ– αA, βαA–Φ 
Pvigilant  sΦ–(1–s)c,  sΦ 
(1–s)(Φ– αA), 
(1–s)(βαA–Φ)–s[c+(1–β)αA] 
Pconfused  (1–s)Φ–sc,  (1–s)Φ 
s(Φ– αA), 
s(βαA–Φ)–(1–s)[c+(1–β)αA] 
Pbelligerent   c, 0  0,  [c+(1–β)αA] 
 
Definition  3.  Define  (x,Φ),  x∈[0,1]  as  the  mixed  strategy,  where  M  plays  (Ψ=0,Φ)  with 
probability (1 x) and (Ψ=1,Φ) with probability x.
38 Define y, y=(y1,y2,y3,y4), y1,y2,y3,y4∈[0,1] 
and  y1+y2+y3+y4=1,  as  the following  probability  distribution:  P  chooses  the action  Pa  with 
                                                 
36 Note that we have excluded P’s decision to reject the offer and not sue M because it is strictly dominated by the decision to 
simply accept the offer, for any Φ>0. There is no difference between accepting and rejecting an offer Φ=0. 
37 There is a bijective function between the two sets {0,1}
{0,1}×[0;∞) and {Pa,Pv,Pc,Pb}
[0;∞). There is also a bijective function 
between the two sets of sequential equilibria. 
38 The pure strategies (Ψ=0,Φ) (not stealing) and (Ψ=1,Φ) (stealing) are represented as (0,Φ) and (1,Φ). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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probability y1, Pv with y2, Pc with y3 and Pb with y4
39. Define (y, ), as the set of all mixed 
strategies, which induce y at the information set  ∈[0;∞). 
 
Of course, all strategies of (y,Φ) must yield the same payoffs against a strategy (x,Φ). 
 
Definition 4. Define UP(Φ,x,y) and UM(Φ,x,y) as the expected payoffs of P and M, given the 
strategy (x,Φ) of M and the set of strategies (y,Φ) of P. 
 
UP(Φ,0,Pa)>UP(Φ,0,Pv)≥UP(Φ,0,Pc)>UP(Φ,0,Pb)  because  Φ>sΦ–(1–s)c≥(1–s)Φ–sc> c,  since 
1>s≥0,5. Therefore (Pa,Φ) is the set of P’s best responses to (0,Φ) for any Φ. 
 




Lemma 1. There is no equilibrium where M plays a pure strategy with Φ< αA and there is no 
equilibrium where P’s strategy is element of the sets (Pa, Φ) or (Pb, Φ), Φ< αA. 
 
Proof.  (Pa,Φ)  is  P’s  best  response  to  (0,Φ).  But  then  (1,Φ)  is  better  for  M  since 
UM(Φ,1,Pa)>UM(Φ,0,Pa)  because  βαA–Φ> Φ.  Since  UP(Φ,1,Pb)>UP(Φ,1,Pc)≥ 
≥UP(Φ,1,Pv)>UP(Φ,1,Pa)  because  0>(1–s)(Φ– αA)≥s(Φ– αA)>(Φ– αA),  (Pb,Φ)  is  P’s  best 
response  to  (1,Φ).  Then  (0,Φ)  is  better  for  M  since  UM(Φ,0,Pb)>UM(Φ,1,Pb)  because 
0>−[c+(1−β)αA]. □ 
 
Lemma 2. (x,Φ) is not a nash equilibrium strategy for 0<Φ< αA. 
 
Proof: From Lemma 1 follows that (0,Φ) and (1,Φ) are not equilibrium strategies. Therefore, if 
(x
*,Φ) were an equilibrium strategy then for the corresponding set of strategies (y
*,Φ) of P the 
following  condition  must  hold:  UM(Φ,0,y
*)=UM(Φ,1,y
*).  y
*≠Pb  also  follows  from  Lemma  1. 
UM(0,0,y)=0 for every possible y, since if M does not steal and does not bribe P, he always gets a 




*,Φ) cannot be the best response to (y
*,Φ) since M is better 
off by playing (0,0). □ 
 
Φ> αA:  
 
M offers more than P could obtain through a lawsuit. We use the concept of sequential equilibria 
to rule out unplausible strategies.
40 
 
                                                 
39 Instead of (1,0,0,0) we write Pa, etc. 
40 We rule out strategies that cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium. Note that we do not give a description of all Nash 
equilibria including those which are not sequential equilibria. For sequential equilibria see Kreps & Wilson (1982a). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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Definition 5. Define b(Φ)∈[0,1] (beliefs) as the probability with which P expects to be at node 
Ψ=1, given that he is at information set Φ. Define U
b(Φ,y,b(Φ)) as the expected payoff of P for 
the strategies of the set (y,Φ) given he is at information set Φ with the beliefs b(Φ). 
 
Lemma 3. The strategy (x,Φ) of M, Φ> αA, cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium. 
A sequential equilibrium strategy of P must be element of the sets (Pa,Φ), Φ> αA. 
 
Proof.  If  Φ> αA,  then  UP(Φ,1,Pa)>UP(Φ,1,Pv)≥UP(Φ,1,Pc)>UP(Φ,1,Pb)  because 
(Φ− αA)>s(Φ− αA)≥(1–s)(Φ– αA)>0,  since  1>s≥0,5.  Since  we  have  already  shown  that 
UP(Φ,0,Pa)>UP(Φ,0,Pv)≥UP(Φ,0,Pc)>UP(Φ,0,Pb) it follows that U
b(Φ,Pa,b(Φ))>U
b(Φ,y,b(Φ)) for 
every y≠Pa, every Φ> αA and every b(Φ). Therefore every strategy of P which is part of a 
sequential equilibrium must be element of the sets (Pa,Φ), Φ> αA. P will accept every offer 
higher  than   αA,  every  other  strategy  would  include  inferior  actions.  Now 
UM(Φ,1,Pa)>UM(Φ,0,Pa)  since  βαA–Φ> Φ.  Therefore  (x,Φ),  Φ> αA  and  x≠1,  cannot  be  a 
sequential  equilibrium  strategy.  For  every  Φ> αA  there  exists  an     with   αA< <Φ  thus 
UM( ,1,Pa)>UM(Φ,1,Pa)  since  βαA– >βαA–Φ.  Therefore  (1,Φ),  Φ> αA,  is  not  a  sequential 
equilibrium strategy. □ 
 




Lemma 4. The strategies (x, αA), x≠1, of M cannot be part of a nash equilibrium.  
The strategies (y, αA), y≠Pa, of P cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium. 
 
Proof. UP( αA,1,y)=0 for all y. If M steals and offers  αA, P will always retrieve  αA, by means 
of either bringing a suit or accepting the bribe. UP( αA,x,Pa)>UP( αA,x,y) y≠Pa and x≠1, if it is 
not sure that M had stolen it is better for P to accept the bribe. UM( αA,1,Pa)>UM( αA,x,Pa) x≠1. 
(Pa, αA) is P’s best response to M’s (x, αA) x≠1. M’s best response to this is (1, αA). Therefore 
(x, αA),  x≠1,  is  not  a  nash  equilibrium  strategy.  Moreover,  UM( αA,1,Pa)=βαA–
 αA>UM( αA,1,y),  y≠Pa,  because  (βαA–Φ)>s(βαA−Φ)−(1–s)[c+(1–β)αA]> 
>(1−s)(βαA−Φ)−s[c+(1–β)αA]> [c+(1–β)αA]  since  Φ= αA.  Therefore  UM( αA,1,y)= 
=βαA− αA−ε, ε>0 and y≠Pa. For every ε>0 there exists an   with  αA< < αA+ε and thus 
UM( ,1,Pa)=βαA− >βαA– αA–ε=UM( αA,1,y).  Therefore  (y, αA),  y≠Pa,  cannot  be  part  of  a 
sequential equilibrium. □ 
 
The  remaining  possible  strategies  of  M  for  a  sequential  equilibrium  are  (x,0),  x≠0,1  and 
(1, αA).
41 The equilibrium strategy of P is element of all sets (Pa,Φ), Φ≥ αA, which means he 
will  always  accept  an  offer  larger  than  or  equal  αA.  Now  for  a  sequential  equilibrium  the 











*(Φ)), for every Φ, and every y. b
*(Φ) are the sequential equilibrium 
beliefs.  Since  0<Φ< αA  is  off  the  equilibrium  path,  thus  played  with  probability  zero  in 
equilibrium,  we  could  form  any  beliefs  in  that  information  sets  and  find  the  corresponding 
                                                 
41 If we mix over Φ, we can exclude strategies that have a positive probability of Φ≠0, αA with the same line of arguments like 
for a pure choice of Φ. No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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equilibrium strategies. Since if (x,0) is an equilibrium strategy then UM(0,1,y)=UM(0,0,y)=0 must 
hold  (Lemma  1)  and  since  UM( αA,1,Pa)=(β− )αA  could  be  bigger,  equal  or  smaller  zero, 
depending on the parameters β and  , we can make no further analyses without information 
about them. □ 
 
Proof  of  Proposition  2.1.   <β  ⇒  (β– )αA>0  ⇒  Mc  strictly  dominates Mh.  To  Md  P’s  best 
response is Pb, and to this Mc is M’s best response. When M plays Mc P is indifferent, since he 
will accept the offer  αA in all four strategies. Thus M’s equilibrium strategy is Mc.  
 









*(0)) for every y. Since Φ=0 is off the 
equilibrium path we can form any beliefs and find the corresponding equilibrium strategy of P. 
Note that in all of these sequential equilibria M steals and offers a bribe, and P accepts. They 
only  differ  in  possible  actions  that  are  off  the  equilibrium  path.  If  we  consider  the  whole 
subgame (before defining a reduced strategy space) we see that in the case of β> , (Ψ=1, αA) 
strictly dominates (Ψ=0,Φ), Φ< αA. Therefore the only justifiable beliefs in the case Φ< αA are 
b(Φ)=1.  Thus,  a  justifiable  equilibrium  strategy  must  be  element  of  all  sets  (Pb,Φ),  Φ< αA 
(Lemma  1).  Thus,  we  have  a  unique  justifiable  equilibrium  in  the  case  of  β> .
42.  This 
equilibrium corresponds to the intuitive result that, if M made an offer smaller than  αA, P 
would reject it and sue. Prob(Ψ=1)=1 since M always steals and offers a bribe and l
*=0 since P 
always accepts the offer. 









α   β








− = − + − =
 
 
Clearly, P chooses  0
* = m  to maximize the payoff, so that  0
* = P U .□ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. With n uncoordinated plaintiff shareholders, M’s strategy set depends 
on n, since M can steal and bribe one, some, or all plaintiff shareholders. Define Mc,k, k=0,1,…,n 
as  a  set  of  strategies,  where  M  bribes  k  shareholders.  The  set  of  all  possible  strategies  is 
DM=Mh∪Mc,0∪Mc,1∪…∪Mc,n
43, where Mc,0 means that M steals but does not bribe anybody 
(Mc,0=Md).  Each  of  the  the  shareholders  P
1,P
2,…,P
n  has  the  same  set  of  strategies 
{Pa,Pv,Pc,Pb}
44. 
Mainly, the payoffs are the same as in the basic model with one plaintiff shareholder. The only 
difference is that multiple shareholders have to share the litigation costs in the case that they sue 
the manager and lose. We assume that they bear the litigation costs according to their stock. That 
is, for example two shareholders with the shares  1,  2 have to bear the costs 




1 c c −
+
−
+    
 
   
 
. 
Similar to the main model, if β>  then Mh is strictly dominated by Mc,n. Independent of the 
plaintiffs’ strategies, M is always better off stealing and bribing everybody than to be honest 
                                                 
42 For justifiable beliefs see McLennan (1985). 
43 Since Mh, Mc,0  and Mc,n are sets of strategies with one element we disregard the difference between the element and the set 
itself. 
44 The strategy space is reduced like in the one plaintiff game. No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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because (β − )αA>0. After eliminating Mh, Pb weakly dominates all other strategies. Independent 
of P
k’s signal, he will always bring an action if he did not receive an offer; consequently, M will 
bribe all shareholders. As in the main model we have dM
*=Mc,n in a sequential equilibrium.  
Since this equilibrium is independent of the signal, all plaintiff shareholders choose m
*=0. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Mc is strictly dominated, since (β− )αA<0. 
 
Definition 6. Define q as the probability of M’s choice Md. (Mc will be played with probability 
zero, since it is strictly dominated.) 
 
Definition  7.  Define  UP,a(q),UP,v(q),UP,c(q),UP,b(q)  as  the  expected  utility  of  P’s  strategy 
(excluding m), given that M chooses a mixed strategy with q as defined in Definition 1. 
 
) )( 1 ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
) )( 1 ( ) )( 1 )( 1 ( ) (





c q q U
A qs c s q q U
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Lemma 5. There is one and only one pair  ∈ q q, (0;1),  q q ≤  ( q q =  if and only if m=0) where 
 
for  q q <   Pa is the best response of P 
for  q q =   P is indifferent between Pa and Pv 
for  q q q < <   Pv is the best response of P 
for  q q =   P is indifferent between Pv and Pb 
for  q q <   Pb is the best response of P 
 
Proof.  ⇔ ≥ 0 m
2
1
) ( ≥ m s c P v P U U , , ≥ ⇒ , because 
 
] 1 , 0 [ ) ( ) ( )] ( ) )( 1 )[( 1 (
)] ( ) )( 1 [( 1 1 2
2
1
, , ∈ ∀ ≤ ⇔ − + − − − ≤
≤ − + − − ⇔ − ≥ ⇔ ≥ ⇔ ≥
q q U q U A q c q s
A q c q s s s s s




Equality given if and only if m=0. If m>0, Pc is strictly dominated and can be eliminated. If m=0 
then UP,c(q)=UP,v(q)∀q∈[0;1], since the signal is random.  
Applying q on the horizontal axis and the expected utility of P, UP, on the vertical axis, UP,a(q), 
UP,v(q), UP,b(q), UP,c(q) define straight lines in a two dimensial coordinate system. The following 
figure shows the best response function given a certain set of parameters. The bold line displays 
P’s best response to M’s choice of q in mixed strategies. 
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Accordingly, there is an interval  ] ; 0 [ q , where Pa is best response, and an interval  ] 1 ; [q , where 
Pb is best response, with  q q ≤ . Finally we have to show that  q q <  for m>0. We do this by 
disproving  q q = .  When  q q =   then  the  lines  ) ( ), ( , , q U q U b P a P   meet  at  q q =   and 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , , q U q U q U q U b P a P b P a P = = =  must be higher or at least equal to  ) ( ) ( , , q U q U v P v P = . If 
not, Pa would not be the best response in the whole interval  ] ; 0 [ q , which is a contradiction to the 
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Consequently,  q q <  holds true and Pv is best response on the interval  ] ; [ q q , m>0. (Note that if 
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= =  
and P is indifferent between Pa, Pv, Pc and Pb) 
 
Calculating  q q, : 
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If  q q =  then P is indifferent between  a P  and  v P . 
If  q q =  then P is indifferent between  v P  and  b P .□ 
 
 
As a consequence of Lemma 1 & 5, M’s equilibrium strategy must involve a  ] ; [ q q q∈ . In all of 
P’s  equilibrium  strategies,  P  will  choose  v P   with  some  (positive)  probability,  if  m>0.  The 
remaining strategies of P (for m>0) are 
 
a pure strategy v P , 
a mixed strategy v P  and  a P , 
and a mixed strategy v P  and  b P  
 
Due to Lemma 1, P’s equilibrium strategy is one under which M is indifferent between  h M  and 
d M .  Since  0 , = h M U ,  independent  of  P’s  strategy,  P’s  equilibrium  strategy  is  one  where 
0 , = d M U . 
 
Definition  8.  Define  ) ( , p U d M   as  M’s  expected  utility  for  Md,  when  P  chooses  Pv  with 
probability p and Pb with probability (1–p). Define  ) ( , p U d M  as M’s expected utility for Md, 
when P chooses Pv with probability p and Pa with probability (1–p). 
 
[ ] ) ) 1 ( )( 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( , A c p A  c s  αA s p p U M M d M α β α β β − − − − + − − + − =  
[ ] ) )( 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( , A p A  c s  A s p p U M d M βα α β βα − + − − + − =  
 
Definition 9. Define  p  on the basis of  0 ) ( , = p U d M  and  p  on the basis of  0 ) ( , = p U d M . 
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[ ]
) )( 1 (
) 1 (




A c p A c s A s p p U d M
α
α β












A p A c s A s p p U d M
+
= ⇔
⇔ = − + − − − + − ⇔ =
α
βα
βα α β βα
 
 
The  payoff  of  d M   is  0 > A βα ,  if  P  chooses  a P ,  and  0 ) ) 1 ( ( < − − − A c α β ,  if  P  chooses b P . 
Depending on whether the payoff of  d M  is smaller, equal, or larger than zero, given that P 
chooses  v P , the equilibrium strategy of P is either a mixed strategy with  v P  and  b P , a pure 
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Accordingly, there is only one equilibrium: P plays a mixed strategy of  v P  and  b P  with 
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The probability of suit is 
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The equilibrium strategy for M is a mixed strategy between  h M  and  d M  with 
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The equilibrium outcomes are (m included) 
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On the limiting value, there is an infinite number of equilibria. 
The pure strategy  v P  is the only equilibrium strategy of P. 
1
* = p  
] ; [
* q q q ∈  
0 )] 1 )( 1 ( ); 1 )( 1 ( [
* > − − + − − + ∈ s q s q s q s q l  
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*  is the equilibrium strategy of M. For P, any mixed 
strategy, for which Um,d=0, is an equilibrium strategy. For the strategies  p  or  p  this condition is 
satisfied, since we did not need the condition m>0 for the calculation of  p p, . 
 
In all cases we have  0
* > l  and 0<q
*=P(Md)=P(Ψ=1)<1.
45. 
After solving all subgames, we determine the optimal monitoring choice of P. 
 
Definition 10. Define  ) (
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= ) (  then  ) (m U P  is discontinuous. Any value inbetween could be the outcome, 
depending on the strategy of M. But if M does not choose the eqilibrium strategy with the best 





= ) ( .  Therefore  only  the  maximum  at  the  discontinuity  remains,  since  the  other 
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* max arg P m U m ∞ ∈ =  holds. 
 
Definition 11. Define U1 and U2 as follows. 
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Then the payoffs and the first derivatives are: 
 
                                                 






*(Φ)) for every Φ, x, y must 
hold true. As we already showed a strategy of P must be an element of the sets (Pa,Φ), Φ≥ αA. For 0<Φ< αA we find 
different equilibria depending on the beiliefs. The concept of justifiable beliefs does not rule out any of those equilibria. No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2007 
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) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 1  and  ∞ = ′ = ′ → → 2 0 1 0 lim lim U U m m . 
Accordingly m
*>0 holds true in all three cases. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If Mh was played with zero probability, then the best response of all 
shareholders would be Pb, since, by definition, M would always be stealing and M’s expected 
payoff  would  be  somewhere  between  (β− )αA<0  and   c−(1−β)αA<0,  depending  on  the 
probability of playing Mc,n. In all cases M would be better off by playing Mh, where his expected 
payoff would be zero; thus, Mh must be part of an equilibrium. However, there cannot be an 
equilibrium where M chooses Mh with a positive probability and where, at the same time, there is 
no  litigation.  If  there  were,  then  every  shareholder  would  have  chosen  Pa.  Clearly,  if  all 
shareholders chose Pa then M’s best response would be Md to which, every single shareholder’s 
best response would be Pb. □ 
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